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Who's Minding the Nonprofit Store:
Does Sarbanes-Oxley Have Anything to
Offer Nonprofits?
By JANE HEATH*
IN JUNE OF 2003, nonprofit public benefit corporation PipeVine,
processor of charitable donations for dozens of charities, closed its
doors, admitting it did not have enough funds to distribute what it
owed to its clients.' The California attorney general filed suit and the
San Francisco Superior Court appointed a receiver to take over the
affairs of the corporation.2 The receiver's preliminary report indicates
PipeVine (formerly known as United Nonprofit Operations or
"UNO") likely owed over $18 million, with cash and assets worth just
over $3 million,3 placing PipeVine among the most costly nonprofit
failures ever. In the post-Enron world, where increased scrutiny of for-
profit corporations has attracted judicial and legislative attention, the
unique attributes of charitable nonprofit corporations have left those
entities largely free to handle extraordinary sums of money intended
for a wide variety of charitable and philanthropic ventures with little
or no public accountability and virtually no ability to discover
problems before they become catastrophic.
* Class of 2005. This Comment is dedicated to the Class of 2005, the law review staff,
and editorial board, especially Carolyn Nelson and Jon McMahon, whose tireless editing
transformed this Comment from idea to reality.
1. Todd Wallack, Nonprofit Admits Spending Charities' Money; Donation Processor's Ac-
counting Problems at Least 2 Years Old, S.F. CHRON., June 5, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Wallack,
Nonprofit Admits Spending Charities' Money].
2. CAL. CORP. CODE § 6513 (Deering 2004) ("[U]pon the application of the plain-
tiff.., the court may appoint a receiver to take over and manage the affairs of the corpora-
tion and to preserve its property pending the hearing and determination of the complaint
for dissolution.").
3. Todd Wallack, PipeVine Owes Charities More; Tally of Donation Center's Debts Revised
Upward to $18 Million, More Than Its Assets, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8, 2003, at C1 [hereinafter
Wallack, PipeVine Owes Charities More].
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Themes of transparency and accountability have been hailed as
panacea for many of the most pernicious problems faced by nonprof-
its (and, for that matter, their for-profit counterparts). What the
PipeVine case study suggests is that even when information indicating
problems is in the public domain, spectacular failures can still occur.
Moreover, since nonprofits have no shareholders and very often no
valuable assets, in contrast to for-profit enterprises, sources to recover
the lost funds are limited or non-existent. A true solution to nonprofit
mismanagement therefore lies within the grasp of all nonprofit
boards. This Comment argues that an effective solution to nonprofit
corporate failings is for the nonprofit sector to voluntarily adopt se-
lected portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the "Act"), which was re-
cently enacted to increase transparency and accountability in for-
profit corporations.4 Part I of this Comment provides a background of
the PipeVine failure and an overview of existing and emergent regula-
tion of nonprofit organizations. Part II discusses the nature of existing
accountability schemes concerning nonprofit corporations and de-
scribes significant gaps in the system that allow nonprofit corporations
to escape the scrutiny required of their for-profit counterparts. Part III
discusses the failings of some solutions proposed to date and offers
voluntary acceptance of portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a viable
solution to nonprofit mismanagement that does not dismantle the en-
tire present system.5
This Comment does not allow for comprehensive treatment of all
aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its potential for application to
nonprofits. Instead, it focuses on several tenets of the Act that illus-
trate major themes intended by the Act's authors to promote public
confidence in, and thus investments in, for-profit corporations. Non-
profits can also benefit from increased public confidence in a similar
way, which may lead to increased charitable contributions or, in the
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in tides 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter, "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" or "the
Act"]. As noted by one commentator:
The Act was designed to increase the transparency, integrity and accountability of
public companies .... The perception that the recent wave of corporate scandals
resulted. . . from a failure of behavior by corporate leaders and corporate attor-
neys, is reflected in the Act's attempt both to capture a broad range of behavior
within its provisions and to foster greater self-policing of behavior not specifically
captured within its provisions.
Note, The Good, the Bad and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the
Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2123, 2123 (2003).
5. The Good, the Bad and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics, supra note 4, at 2123.
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least, the curtailing of their current downward trend,6 attributed by
some to mistrust engendered by governance scandals and the attend-
ant crises of confidence in both the commercial and nonprofit
sectors.
7
I. Background
A. The Story of PipeVine
A unique feature of the demise of PipeVine Corporation that
makes it a useful example for further study is that, unlike recent finan-
cial scandals that rocked the nonprofit world, such as the embezzle-
ment by national United Way Chairman William Aramony8 or the self-
dealing by directors of the Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate,9 the
receiver has concluded that the PipeVine failure involved no embez-
zlement or conflict of interest. 10 Though the receiver's report is pre-
liminary, it appears that PipeVine simply suffered from poor
accounting practices and well-intentioned but woefully inadequate at-
tempts to keep a sinking ship afloat." Unless new evidence is discov-
ered, PipeVine's failure may be characterized as misfeasance rather
than the malfeasance that has become a common feature of recent
business scandals. 12
PipeVine was originally formed as a subsidiary of United Way of
the Bay Area ("United Way").' 3 In 1993, United Way formed
6. See Ian Wilhelm, Toward a Cautious Optimism, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 19,
2004, at 37; Editorial, A Donor's Dilemma, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 3, 2003, at A22.
7. See Ellen McCarthy, Lingering Doubts Give Donors Pause, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2003,
at E9.
8. See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law,
and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REv. 593, 593-94 (discussing Aramony's conviction for theft
after it was discovered that United Way's assets were funding his extravagant lifestyle).
9. Id. (trustees of the charitable trust and their associates were found to have im-
properly benefited from the administration of the trust, resulting in the resignation or
removal of five trustees).
10. Rebecca Vesely, PipeVine Scrutinized for Monies Owed, OAKLAND TRIB., Sept. 25, 2003,
at Al.
11. Id.
12. Misfeasance is defined as "[t]he performance of a lawful act in an unlawful or
negligent manner" as contrasted with malfeasance, defined as "[t]he performance of an
unlawful or wrongful act, esp. by a public official." THE NEW INTERNATIONAL WEBSTER'S
CONCISE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 436, 463 (Sidney Landau ed., Trident
Press Int'l 2002). In this Comment, malfeasance will be used to refer to criminally culpable
conduct. Misfeasance will be used to refer to negligent but not necessarily criminal acts.
13. See Todd Wallack, Nonprofit Kept Millions it Collected for Charity; PipeVine Siphoned
Donations into Company Coffers for 3 Years, S.F. CHRON., June 26, 2003, at Al [hereinafter
Wallack, Nonprofit Kept Millions]; Todd Wallack, Charities Had Been Wary of PipeVine; United
Ways Doubted Nonprofit's Methods, S.F. CHRON., June 29, 2003, at A21 [hereinafter Wallack,
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PipeVine's predecessor, UNO, to handle the day-to-day operations of
collecting and distributing funds for United Way employer-based giv-
ing campaigns. United Way is the largest director of workplace giving
campaigns in Northern California, collecting over $40 million annu-
ally, primarily through payroll deductions from Bay Area companies. 14
United Way provides a structure for workplace giving campaigns
where employees solicit other employees to have a percentage of their
wages deducted from their paychecks. United Way then distributes
the funds to local charities, which provide direct assistance and ser-
vices to the community. The charities supported by United Way in-
clude everything from childcare centers to senior food programs. For
many programs, United Way provides the largest single percentage of
their operating funds. 15
In early 1993, United Way employees formed UNO, PipeVine's
predecessor corporation as a "nonprofit public benefit corpora-
ton . . . organized under the Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation
Law for charitable purposes."'16 UNO's purpose was set forth in its Ar-
ticles of Incorporation: "to provide cost-effective services to indepen-
dent United Ways and other nonprofit entities which have established
their tax-exempt status under Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, and to engage in such other activities as may be deemed in
the general interest of charity in the State of California."17
UNO initially provided services exclusively for United Way. The
two nonprofits shared office space and equipment 18 and United Way
paid UNO's employees. 19 To the general public, UNO was indistin-
guishable from United Way. However, effective July 1, 2000, United
Way severed its connection with UNO. 20 According to its Amended
Articles of Incorporation, UNO thereafter became PipeVine, Incorpo-
Charities Had Been Wary of PipeVine]; see also Receiver's Status Report and Notice of Interim
Request for Payment of Fees (July 3-August 31), Lockyer v. Pipevine, Inc. (Super. Ct. S.F.
County Sept. 24, 2003) (No. CGC-03-422010).
14. UNITED WAY OF THE BAY AREA, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2004), available at http://
www.theunitedway.org/aboutus/ annual%20report.pdf (last accessed Apr. 4, 2004) [here-
inafter UNITED WAY, ANNUAL REPORT].
15. UNITED WAY OF THE BAY AREA, ABOUT Us, at http://www.theunitedway.org/about-
us/aboutus.htm (last accessed Apr. 4, 2004) [hereinafter UNITED WAY, ABOUT Us].
16. UNITED NONPROFIT OPERATIONS, INC., ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION (Feb. 17,
1993).
17. Id. at art. II, 1 B.
18. Todd Wallack, PipeVine, United Way Fight Over Assets, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 2003, at
B2 [hereinafter Wallack, Fight Over Assets].
19. Second Amended Complaint at 3, Chu v. PipeVine, Inc. (Super. Ct. S.F. County
Sept. 9, 2003) (No. CGC-03-420951) (original complaint filed May 30, 2003).
20. Wallack, Charities Had Been Wary of PipeVine, supra note 13, at A21.
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rated.2' Former United Way Executive Vice President and thirty year
employee of United Way, Frank Melcher, became the president of
PipeVine. 22 PipeVine's address remained the same as United Way's
and the two companies continued to share at least office equipment
and vehicles. 23 While the name change and new board placed some
distance between the two companies, a lay observer would have found
the distinction difficult to discern.
In the world of large, charitable nonprofits, the details of process-
ing donations can be extraordinarily complex. For nonprofits that
raise funds through pledge drives, later collecting the redeemed
pledges, there is the additional difficulty of matching payments with
pledges. As the internet increasingly became a vehicle for charitable
giving 24 and more and more people used credit cards to manage their
financial affairs, including charitable giving, the task became more
complicated still. The advent of increasingly dedicated and sophisti-
cated software systems also required special expertise to acquire and
use.25 That is the niche PipeVine sought to carve out for itself. If it
could provide pledge processing services for companies less expen-
sively than the companies themselves, then it stood to be successful.
To do so, PipeVine had to deliver the services at a cost that was a
reasonable percentage deducted from the amounts collected for char-
itable causes. PipeVine's agreements with its clients authorized it to
deduct fees averaging seven cents for every dollar collected. 26
PipeVine entered into contracts with nonprofits to handle all of
their pledge matching and donation collection. 27 For some compa-
nies PipeVine collected the funds, deducted its fees, and distributed
21. UNITED NONPROFIT OPERATIONS, INC., STATEMENT BY DOMESTIC NONPROFIT CORPO-
RATION (2000); UNITED NONPROFIT OPERATIONS, INC., CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT OF ARTI-
CLES OF INCORPORATION (May 18, 2000) (changing the corporation name to PipeVine,
Incorporated).
22. See NEIGHBOR TO NATION, ABOUT US (2002), at http://www.shareamerica.org/
melcher.htm (last accessed Apr. 4, 2004) (brief biography of Frank Melcher).
23. See Receiver's Inventory at 5-6, Lockyer v. Pipevine, Inc. (Super. Ct. S.F. County
Sept. 23, 2003) (No. CGC-03-422010).
24. Network For Good, for example, is a charitable nonprofit formed in 2001 by suc-
cessful internet companies including Cisco Systems, Inc., AOL, Inc., and Yahoo!, Inc. for
the purpose of encouraging the internet as a source of philanthropic activity. See NETWORK
FOR GOOD, ABOUT Us (2004), at http://www.networkforgood.org/about (last accessed Apr.
4, 2004).
25. Shalini Chatterjee, PipeVine Uses'Sun to Grow Philanthropy, SUN NET WORK MAC., 3
(July 22, 2003), at http://www.interbridge.com/chatterbox/PipeVine.html (last accessed
Apr. 3, 2004).
26. See Wallack, Nonprofit Admits Spending Charities' Money, supra note 1, at Al.
27. Id.
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the balance directly to the client.28 For others, they provided the addi-
tional service of distributing funds to specific charities designated by
the client and then reporting that activity to the client.29 The United
Way of King County, Washington ("UWKC") was a case in point. Be-
ginning in August of 2001, PipeVine began handling half of UWKC's
pledge processing services in addition to Designation Payout and Re-
porting Services (distribution of funds to charities designated by
UWKC) .30 In January of 2002, after numerous "test files," UWKC con-
cluded that PipeVine could not adequately perform the services it
promised and cancelled that agreement.3 1 PipeVine continued, how-
ever, to provide the distribution services for UWKC, but under scru-
tiny by IJWKC personnel.32 Unlike other PipeVine customers, UWKC
required that PipeVine open. a separate bank account in UWKC's
name and that checks from that account could only be written upon
the express authorization of LJWKC. 33 United Way of King County was
the only PipeVine client to require such an account, demonstrating,
as it turned out, an excellent way that the problem could have been
avoided or, at a minimum, discovered sooner.3 4
In addition to providing its services to United Way organizations,
PipeVine solicited the donation processing business of numerous
other nonprofits. Those included Network for Good 35 and several
prominent for-profit corporations that administered their own em-
ployee giving campaigns including Clorox, Macy's, Bank of America,
and others.3 6 When it closed, PipeVine was reportedly handling $100
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Declaration of Mike Pete in Support of Motion of United Way of King County
for an Order Authorizing and Directing Release of Segregated Funds to United Way of
King County at 1-4, Lockyer v. Pipevine, Inc. (Super. Ct. S.F. Aug. 15, 2003) (No. CGC-03-
422010).
31. UWKC may not have been the only client who had that experience. Other United
Way clients around the country complained that they severed relationships with PipeVine
because its reports were incomplete and it would not supply an audit of its operations. See
Wallack, Charities Had Been Wary of PipeVine, supra note 13, at Al.
32. See Declaration of Mike Pete at 3, Lockyer v. Pipevine, Inc. (No. CGC-03-422010).
33. Id.
34. King County figures prominently in the fight over PipeVine's residual assets as the
segregated account remains intact. The Attorney General has, initially at least, opposed the
return of those funds to King County. See Declaration of Frank Melcher in Support of
Motion of United Way of King County for an Order Authorizing and Directing Release of
Segregated Funds to United Way of King County at 1-3, Lockyer v. Pipevine, Inc. (Super.
Ct. S.F. Aug. 15, 2003) (No. CGC-03-422010).
35. Todd Wallack, Charitable Funding Mystery: Firm that Handles Millions a Year Shuts
Suddenly, S.F. CHRON., June 4, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Wallack, Charitable Funding Mystery].
36. See Wallack, Charities Had Been Wary of PipeVine, supra note 13, at Al, A21.
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million in donations annually.37 Based on the average seven cents of
every dollar deducted for its services, PipeVine's total revenue should
have been approximately $7 million. However, two years before its clo-
sure its revenue was reported on tax returns at over $11 million, with
only $57,000 of that from passive interest income. 38
Tax returns for fiscal year 1999/2000, filed with the California
Attorney General in 2001, show that the company had negative net
assets of $1,176,580. 39 While there may be some explanation for the
figure, owing to the imminent divestiture by United Way (which had
previously employed all of UNO's employees) there is no evidence
that anyone took any particular notice. A year later, just as PipeVine
changed its name, tax returns for 2000/2001 showed net assets of
$250,000, suggesting that things had improved from the year before.
Taking a closer look at that same return and comparing it to the previ-
ous year's, PipeVine went from no employees earning over $50,000
per year and two unpaid directors in 1999/2000 to twenty-three em-
ployees paid over $50,000 per year (averaging over $64,000 each, in-
cluding benefits) and seven directors, two of whom were paid a total
of over $400,000 per year in salary and benefits by 2001.40 PipeVine
also paid over $1.1 million to its five highest paid consultants that
same year. 41
A more detailed study of the tax returns strongly suggests that,
based on the reported funds collected and paid to PipeVine for its
services, as early as 2001 PipeVine may already have been exceeding
its reported contractual right to an average of seven cents of every
dollar collected. 42 Even if it could not be readily discovered just from
the tax returns, PipeVine director Robert Martin, who signed the re-
turns as its Secretary and Treasurer and earned over $160,000 per year
in salary and benefits for his efforts,43 presumably had access to
enough information to conduct a thorough investigation. When it
closed less than two years later, PipeVine owed $18 million to its cli-
ents. 44 If PipeVine processed $100 million per year as reported, and
37. Id. at A21.
38. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHARITY SEARCH, at http://
justice.doj.ca.gov/charitysr/default.asp (last accessed May 23, 2004) (search engine for the
attorney general's charitable trust for public tax filings) [hereinafter OFICE OF THE ArTOR-
NEY GEN., CHARITY SEARCH].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Wallack, PipeVine Owes Charities More, supra note 3, at Cl.
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charged processing costs of seven cents on every dollar processed ($7
million) with actual costs running eight to nine cents per dollar45 (up
to a $2 million per year deficit), simple arithmetic suggests it took
more than two years for the company to owe $18 million. That analy-
sis, although simplistic, strongly indicates that UNO/PipeVine em-
ployees and United Way either knew or should have known there was
a money management problem even before PipeVine split off from
United Way. While very little about the financial health of the com-
pany may be gleaned just from tax returns without access to the docu-
ments used to prepare them, the relatively large salaries and
consulting fees suggest that, at the very least, some red flags were pre-
sent with respect to the company's finances, especially when viewed in
light of the spectacular failure less than two years later.
It is not absolutely clear when PipeVine's directors or United Way
learned that PipeVine was in serious financial difficulty, but it was evi-
dently known by early 2003. Gia Nguyen and Jackson Chu, two
PipeVine employees allegedly fired in January of 200346 who filed a
lawsuit for wrongful termination against PipeVine and United Way,
claim they told management about accounting irregularities in the
months prior to their termination. 47 Their complaint alleges that after
they first complained to management about accounting problems,
United Way's own Chief Financial Officer, George Chen, looked into
the issue. 48 According to a January 31, 2003 letter attached to the
complaint, Mr. Chen allegedly created a hostile work environment for
the two employees. 49 Whether or not those allegations are true, if the
CFO of United Way was interacting with employees of PipeVine con-
cerning accounting issues in 2002, it strongly suggests that problems
were at least suspected at that time. Nguyen and Chen reportedly met
with the management of United Way and PipeVine in February of
2003 and, in principle, reached a settlement concerning
"whistleblower" claims. The pair filed suit on May 30, 2003, naming as
defendants United Way, PipeVine, and attorneys for both companies,
45. Wallack, Nonprofit Kept Millions, supra note 13, at A14.
46. When staff were cut, however, the company claimed "revenue was down because
of the economic downturn." Wallack, Charitable Funding Mystery, supra note 35, at A16.
47. See Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 3 (and letter datedJanuary 31, 2003
attached thereto), Chu v. PipeVine, Inc. (Super. Ct. S.F. County Sept. 9, 2003) (No. CGC-
03-420951) (original complaint filed May 30, 2003).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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claiming PipeVine and United Way reneged on that agreement. 50 On
June 2, 2003, PipeVine shut its doors and ceased all operations.
5
'
On June 4, 2003, PipeVine issued a statement "deeply re-
gret[ting]" the shutdown. 52 The statement detailed some of the events
leading to the decision to close. According to that document,
PipeVine senior management and the Board of Directors ("the
Board") first became aware of a "potential accounting problem" in
February and immediately requested its outside auditors, Grant
Thornton (also United Way's auditors53 and well established in non-
profit accounting 54) to investigate. Finding no evidence of accounting
problems, Grant Thornton suggested a second opinion. 55 The Board
thus hired accountants Hood & Strong in March of 2003 and brought
in new Chief Executive Officer David Curtis, an expert in "turnaround
management."56 When Hood & Strong reported its preliminary find-
ings that PipeVine's financial statements did not reflect the full
amount owed to its clients, the new CEO turned to United Way and
requested a $5 million loan. This request was rejected.57 The decision
was then made by the Board to close the company and lay off all fifty-
five employees.58
It is significant that PipeVine's tax returns, filed with the Califor-
nia attorney general and available on the attorney general's website,
revealed a pattern that could have raised the suspicions of anyone
who looked critically at those documents, and certainly the person
who signed them should have been aware of the problems. 59 Moreo-
ver, since the documents are a matter of public record, the United
Way, any interested PipeVine client, or any member of the public, had
ready access to the information. That PipeVine's impending failure
was not discovered by virtue of documents in the public domain, as
well as the strong implication that the United Way's Chief Financial
50. Id.
51. UNITED WAY OF THE BAY AREA, PIPEVINE STATEMENT (June 4, 2003), at http://www.
uwba.org/about-us/commitment.htm (last accessed Dec. 3, 2003) [hereinafter UNITED
WAY, PIPEVINE STATEMENT].
52. Id.
53. UNITED WAY, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 10.
54. See GRANT THORNTON, LLP, ABOUT GRANT THORNTON (2004), at http://www.
grantthornton.com/content/10786.asp (last accessed Apr. 4, 2004).
55. See UNITED WAY, PIPEVINE STATEMENT, supra note 51; Wallack, Nonprofit Kept Mil-
lions, supra note 13, at A14.
56. UNITED WAY, PIPEVINE STATEMENT, supra note 51, at 1.
57. Todd Wallack, Nonprofit Kept Millions, supra note 13, at A14.
58. UNITED WAY, PIPEVINE STATEMENT, supra note 51.
59. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., CHARITY SEARCH, supra note 38.
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Officer knew of the impending failure several months before it oc-
curred, leads to the inescapable conclusion that any regulatory failure
did not stem from information that was beyond public scrutiny. It fol-
lows, then, that the problem with nonprofit misfeasance, as illustrated
by PipeVine, may not be that not enough is known about what is going
on in nonprofits, 60 but rather that not enough is done with the infor-
mation that is known.
B. The Law
1. Overview of Existing Regulation
a. State Attorneys General
Every state has some form of oversight of nonprofit charitable
organizations, typically through the state attorney general's office. 61
In California, for example, the attorney general's office administers
nonprofit regulation through its Charitable Trusts Division. 62 Califor-
nia's regulatory scheme requires, among other things, that every char-
itable organization register with the attorney general's office before
conducting fundraising activities. 63 When a public benefit corporation
is formed in California, the secretary of state's office automatically
transmits a copy of the company's articles of incorporation to the at-
torney general's office.6 4 Thereafter, any non-exempt organization 65
with assets over $25,000 is required to file its tax returns annually with
60. There is discussion throughout the charitable nonprofit sector concerning a need
for and interest in greater "transparency" in operations. See, e.g., INDEP. SECTOR, STATEMENT
OF VALUES AND CODE OF ETHICS FOR NONPROFIT AND PHILANTHROPIC ORGANIZATIONS, http:/
/www.independentsector.org/members/code-main.html (last accessed Apr. 8, 2004); Me-
dia Release, United Way of the Bay Area, United Way of the Bay Area Announces Indepen-
dent Advisory Board on Financial Accounting and Reporting (Nov. 2, 2003) (on file with
U.S.F. Law Review) (announcing United Way's appointment of a Technical Advisory Board
on Financial Accounting and Reporting).
61. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 12580-12599.5 (Deering 2004) (providing the basis
for the existence of nonprofit corporations in the state); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 5000-6910
(Deering 2004) (covering the Attorney General's jurisdiction over nonprofits).
62. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDE
FOR CHARITIES (1998) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDE].
63. Id. at 39.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Hospitals and religious organizations are exempt from filing tax returns and are
therefore not subject to the attorney general's filing and reporting requirements. CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 12580-12598 (Deering 2004); OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., CAL. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://caag.state.ca.us/charities/faq.htm
(last accessed Apr. 3, 2004) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., FAQ].
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the attorney general. 66 In the event of an allegation of malfeasance or
misfeasance, the California attorney general has exclusive jurisdiction
over actions against nonprofit public benefit or charitable corpora-
tions. 67 The office is empowered to investigate and, where appropri-
ate, intervene to protect the public. 68
b. Other Agency Regulation
In addition to state regulation, nonprofits that contract with the
federal government, such as hospitals or social service agencies, may
be subject to other statutes, and their mishandling of financial affairs
can also result in federal criminal prosecution. 69 As with state regula-
tion, however, it is unlikely that misfeasance will result in criminal
prosecution. For example, while the FBI is reportedly investigating the
PipeVine failure, there is no evidence to date that any federal law was
broken.7
0
Additional oversight of nonprofits occurs through the Internal
Revenue Service's ("IRS") policing of tax exempt status. 71 While the
IRS is relatively aggressive in enforcing the provisions of section
501 (c) (3), the Internal Revenue Code section that confers tax exempt
status,72 there is no basis for IRS oversight if the business activities of a
charitable organization do not violate the tax exempt provisions.
PipeVine, for example, was unlikely to attract IRS attention as there is
no allegation that it ever operated outside its structure as a nonprofit
charitable organization.
c. Fiduciary Responsibilities of Nonprofit Directors
In California, as in other states, executives of nonprofit corpora-
tions, similar to their for-profit counterparts, are subject to the sword
66. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., GuIDE, supra note 62, at 39-40; CAL. Gov'T
CODE §§ 12580-12598.
67. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12591.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 465 U.S. 482 (1984).
70. See Todd Wallack, FBI Criminal Probe of Defunct S.F Firm; It Diverted Millions in Chari-
table Donations, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 20, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Wallack, FBI Criminal Probe].
71. See I.R.C. §501(c) (3) (1994).
72. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
(nonprofit lobbying organization not entitled to tax exempt'status); Am. Soc'y of Ass'n
Executives v. United States, 195 F.3d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (disallowing lobbying expenses as
tax deductions where nonprofit split itself into two entities to maintain its tax exempt
status).
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and shield of the business judgment rule.73 If a nonprofit director ex-
ercises judgment based on a reasonable investigation in good faith,
which she believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, she
will generally not be held personally accountable even if that judg-
ment ultimately proves to be flawed. 74 Since a court will not generally
substitute its judgment for that of the corporation's directors where
the provisions of the rule apply,75 it is rare for directors to be found
personally liable for negligent business decisions, or even benign
neglect.
2. The Applicability of Sarbanes-Oxley to Nonprofits
While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifically applies to for-profit,
publicly traded companies, 76 there are a few provisions that apply to
all corporations, including nonprofits. The Act includes a policy con-
cerning document destruction and a provision protecting employee
whistleblowers, both of which are not limited to for-profit entities. 77
The document destruction provisions expand the government's abil-
ity to criminally prosecute those who destroy documents in an effort
to thwart federal investigation or prosecution. 78 The whistleblower
provisions protect all employees against retaliation from their employ-
ers for cooperating in federal law enforcement efforts. 79 Because the
definition of law enforcement is broad, including the IRS and the FBI,
the provisions potentially implicate virtually every company in the
United States.80
Other provisions of the Act are applicable exclusively to publicly
traded companies that are subject to the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934.81 Most other companies, including nonprofits, are formed
under the provisions of state law, so an act of Congress would not
73. See Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 583 n.14 (1986); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 7231 (Deering 2004) (setting forth the business judgment rule applicable to
directors of nonprofit corporations).
74. See Finley v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 132 (Ct. App. 2000).
75. See Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass'n, 980 P.2d 940,
945 (Cal. 1999).
76. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in titles 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.)
77. See W. Warren Hamel, It's NotJust About Enron: A Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for
Nonprofit Organizations, Ass'N MGMT. (Am. Soc'y of Ass'n Executives) (Mar. 2003), reprinted
by NAT'L GR.ANTS MGMT. Ass'N, at http://www.ngma-grants.org/docs/2003conf/Handout_
Hamel.doc (last accessed Apr. 4, 2004).
78. Id. at 1-2.
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id. at 1.
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ordinarily apply to those entities except, as illustrated by the docu-
ment destruction and whistleblower provisions of the Act, where the
issues implicate federal prosecutorial jurisdiction. It is not surprising,
then, that state legislatures and attorneys general have begun to ex-
amine whether provisions of the Act might be applied or adapted to
those companies that are presently subject exclusively to state
regulation.8 2
3. Proposed Regulation
Since Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted in 2002, over a dozen states
have proposed or enacted legislation patterned on the Act to reach
state-chartered companies in general and nonprofit companies in par-
ticular.8  In New York, Attorney General Elliot Spitzer was among the
first to propose such legislation.8 4 The New York proposal originally
included a requirement that all nonprofits verify the accuracy of the
financial information presented to their boards and that those with
paid staff or revenues above $250,000 comply with even more rigorous
requirements. 85 After input from New York nonprofits, the floor for
the more extensive (and expensive) reporting was raised to reach
companies with over $1 million in revenue.8 6 The law also requires
that the majority of New York nonprofits create separate audit com-
mittees, similar to the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 87
California has introduced a similar proposal, called the "Non-
profit Integrity Act of 2004.''88 Its version is primarily aimed at compa-
nies that conduct fundraising activities in the state and is intended to
address what are considered to be significant abuses, including solici-
tations in a charity's name that actually result in a very small percent-
age of the funds collected going to that charity. 89 Though much of
the bill's text is directed at such commercial fundraisers, it also in-
82. Hearings were held in June of 2004 to look into alleged abuses by tax-exempt
entities with an eye toward developing federal legislation to address nonprofit governance.
Though no bill has yet emerged, the legislative eye has indeed focused on increased scru-
tiny of nonprofits at the national level. See Charles Storch, Senate Committee Targets Non-
Profits' Financial Dealings, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 2004, at 3.
83. See Erik Cummins, Nonprofit Squeeze: Proposed Legislation Would Add Disclosure and
Auditing Rules Similar to Those Faced By Corporate Entities, S.F. RECORDER, Mar. 30, 2004, at 1.
84. See Fred Stokeld, Bill to Apply Sarbanes-Oxley to New York Nonprofits Revised, 100 TAx
NOTES 753, at 753 (2003).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See discussion of particular provisions of the Act infra Part III.
88. See Cummins, supra note 83, at 1.
89. Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2003, S.B. 1262, 2003-2004 Leg. (Cal. 2004).
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cludes a number of provisions that parallel aspects of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.90 Similar to the New York proposal, California's law would
require nonprofits with annual revenues over $500,000 to be indepen-
dently audited and to provide copies of those audits to the Attorney
General's Charitable Trusts Section, as well as making them available
to anyone who requests them.91 The bill further requires that non-
profits use separate accountancy firms for auditing and other account-
ing work to avoid conflicts of interest that may arise if the same firm is
providing financial services for strategic planning and also determin-
ing the financial health of the business to provide to outsiders.9 2 As
with Sarbanes-Oxley, Senate Bill 1262 would require nonprofit boards
of directors to set up dedicated audit committees with board members
who sit on no other committees and are not paid for their service.93
Another aspect of the Act that received attention in the bill concerns
increased board and attorney general oversight of executive compen-
sation and loans by the nonprofits to their executives.9 4 An especially
controversial provision of the bill would require the top executive of a
nonprofit to certify the financial statements of the company, allowing
for increased personal liability if the statements are found to be at
variance from the true financial state of the company.9 5
On the federal front, the IRS is also considering regulatory re-
forms applicable to nonprofits.9 6 Like the state attorneys general, the
IRS is looking at modifying regulations to implement some aspects of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.9 7 The IRS is particularly focused on increas-
ing the effectiveness of nonprofit boards of directors to protect orga-
nizations' assets.98 Among the proposals under consideration are
recommendations concerning conflict-of-interest policies for all non-
profit boards, encouraging board members to ask questions of the
firm's managers, obtaining audit reports, including financially literate
people as directors, and ensuring reasonable compensation for non-
profit executives.99
90. See Cummins, supra note 83, at 1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Sherri Begin, Nonprofits Consider Changes as IRS Weighs New Oversight Rules,
CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., Feb. 23, 2004, at 16.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Against the backdrop of imminent legislative and regulatory re-
forms, there is incentive for the nonprofit sector to take a serious look
at itself and consider which provisions of the Act can reasonably be
adopted and which would likely threaten their very existence. That
self analysis will put nonprofits in a better position to implement the
provisions most likely to ultimately become law as well as to identify
and document the ways in which some provisions impose costs or
other burdens disproportionate to their benefits. Nonprofits can then
develop credible opposition to certain legislative efforts.
II. Who's Watching Nonprofits and What Do They See?
The primary problem presented by the current state of regula-
tion of nonprofit charitable organizations is that, as long as the com-
pany is operating within its tax-exempt status, there is very little
scrutiny of on-going operations. After-the-fact actions by a state's attor-
ney general's office or federal prosecutors are unlikely to result in res-
toration of funds in situations such as PipeVine's $18 million shortfall.
In California, though the attorney general's office has the authority to
investigate and intervene in the affairs of most nonprofit charitable
enterprises, the state legislature has never adequately funded that ef-
fort.100 California's attorney general's office receives hundreds of
complaints concerning charities and charitable solicitation every
year. 101 But, the available resources allow thorough investigation of
only a few of the most egregious claims.
In the case of PipeVine, it appears that the press release that
PipeVine was closing its doors, owing unspecified amounts of money
to dozens of charity and corporate clients, was the first official indica-
tion of a problem that the attorney general's office received. While
the office acted relatively quickly thereafter, filing its lawsuit for disso-
lution, accounting, and appointment of a receiver within thirty days
after the announcement, the best that could be achieved by regulatory
involvement at that point was to stop the bleeding, which arguably
had already occurred with the closing of the business. If there is no
criminal or civil liability of any culpable party with resources to restore
misspent funds, all the attorney general can achieve is to have the
costs of the investigation and dissolution borne from the remaining
assets of PipeVine, leaving even less money to pay the clients and, ulti-
mately, the beneficiaries of the various charity clients. The applicable
100. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., FAQ supra note 65.
101. Id.
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law provides for the costs of the receiver's investigation, including the
receiver's compensation, fees, costs of the receiver's attorney, and the
attorney general's costs of enforcement, to be paid out of the remain-
ing assets of the company.10 2
That is not to suggest that the attorney general's office was wrong
to take action against PipeVine. It had little choice. The office is re-
sponsible for ensuring that charitable organizations act within their
stated objectives and for seeing that charitable assets go to their in-
tended beneficiaries. 10 3 Moreover, before a receiver was appointed
and conducted a relatively comprehensive investigation, the attorney
general could not know how the failure occurred, whether there was
criminal or civil liability, and/or whether some method was available
to seek restoration of funds.10 4 The receiver has found no evidence of
embezzlement, and the directors may well have reasonably relied on
data provided by company management. The application of the busi-
ness judgment rule suggests that, even if one or more directors has
some assets which might be tapped, they would not be found suffi-
ciently culpable to ever result in significant recovery of funds.'0 5
It appears, then, that when a nonprofit fails, particularly due to
negligence by its directors as opposed to criminal acts, the chances of
donors' funds reaching their intended recipients is slim, even where
some assets remain. The laws governing nonprofits do not include any
early warning systems and efforts after the fact are likely to siphon off
remaining assets to pay for the orderly winding up of the company's
affairs, as may well be the case for PipeVine. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the very real danger that the perception of inadequate over-
sight will adversely affect the behavior of potential donors to
102. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12597, 12598 (Deering 2004).
103. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12591 (Deering 2004).
104. Recent press reports indicate that the FBI has begun a criminal investigation of
the PipeVine failure; however, review of the receiver's bills to date make it clear that the
Justice Department and the FBI were having discussions with the receiver within days of his
appointment and yet his report stated that no embezzlement has been discovered. The
question remains open whether some other criminal breach of the public trust occurred.
See Wallack, FBI Criminal Probe, supra note 70, at A]; Receiver's Status Report and Notice of
Interim Request for Payment of Fees and Expenses, Lockyer v. Pipevine, Inc. (Super. Ct.
S.F. County Sept. 23, 2003) (No. CGC-03-422010).
105. While the receiver is reportedly continuing to pursue potentially culpable parties
including, possibly, the audit firm that performed outside audits of PipeVine for years
prior to the failure, a settlement has been reached with United Way of the Bay Area.
United Way will pay $3.45 million to the receiver and forego $6 million in contributions it
never received from PipeVine in exchange for being absolved of responsibility for the re-
maining shortfall. See Todd Wallack, Charity Settles in PipeVine Fiasco, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19,
2004, at BI [hereinafter Wallack, PipeVine Fiasco].
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nonprofit charitable organizations is itself sufficient justification to
consider solutions.
HI. Solutions
A. Proposed Solutions from Outside the Nonprofit Sector
Legal scholars have suggested a number of approaches to solving
the lack of oversight of nonprofit operations. All of them focus almost
exclusively on avoiding, preventing, or addressing malfeasance. None
focuses primarily on the prevention or avoidance of misfeasance. The
following section discusses why none of those approaches are ade-
quate to address the most likely sources of problems in charitable
nonprofit companies, illustrated so strikingly by PipeVine's $18 mil-
lion shortfall.
1. Solution One: Modify the Business Judgment Rule
The first proposed solution suggests increased liability and scru-
tiny of nonprofit directors, who enjoy some measure of protection
from liability by virtue of the business judgment rule.'0 6 Some suggest
removing or significantly weakening such shields. 10 7
Even if state legislatures could be persuaded to pass this kind of
legislation, such a proposed solution is likely to result in the inability
of nonprofit corporations to attract qualified directors. Successful bus-
iness professionals who could do the most good as board members of
nonprofits may not be willing to lend their expertise if their own assets
are placed in jeopardy by errors in judgment. The inability to attract
talent on their boards of directors is likely to lead to fewer nonprofits.
Such a result is especially undesirable at a time when shrinking gov-
ernment funding often places essential social services in the nonprofit
market.
Moreover, qualified, experienced directors are essential to pre-
vent misfeasance. If problems such as PipeVine can occur under the
noses of apparently qualified directors, a proposal that results in more
difficulty securing the services of competent members of the business
community to serve on nonprofit boards seems to be a cure that could
ultimately be worse than the disease. In the PipeVine case, for exam-
ple, it is doubtful that such increased liability would have had a mea-
surable effect. Unless the directors were extraordinarily wealthy
106. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT, §§ 8.42, 8.52 (Revised 1988).
107. See Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations,
1999 Wis. L. REv. 227, 270-71.
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individuals, they are unlikely to be able to restore over $18 million.
Furthermore, if they did have such wealth and were held liable for the
loss due to negligently failing to discover financial irregularities, no
person of means would ever again agree to serve in such a capacity. As
the proposed legislative reforms suggest, 08 nonprofit boards are likely
to need more qualified directors in the future, not fewer, in order to
meet requirements for separate audit committees comprised of indi-
viduals with financial expertise.
2. Solution Two: Independent Oversight Boards
It has also been suggested that independent boards or commis-
sions could be used to oversee nonprofit operations. 0 9 That is, in fact,
similar to one feature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applicable to for-
profit enterprises. 110 Sarbanes-Oxley mandated the creation of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), under the
direction of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")."' The
PCAOB consists of five members, none of whom may be currently em-
ployed by an accountancy corporation, to oversee the work of ac-
countants providing audit services to public companies. 112 The
PCAOB, however, has been subject to significant criticism for creating
an additional and potentially conflicting layer of oversight beyond
states' accountancy boards and the SEC. 113
The sheer number and variety of nonprofits and the already chal-
lenging prospect of attracting qualified individuals to manage them
makes such a solution practically untenable. There is simply insuffi-
cient incentive for community members to serve in such a capacity
when the demand for volunteers to provide direct service to needy
community members often goes unmet due to lack of human re-
sources. Increased regulation of any kind also has the unintended
consequence of heightening public skepticism, producing a chilling
effect on all donations, hurting every charitable cause regardless of its
relative lack of culpability.1 4 Most importantly, the proponents of vol-
unteer citizen advisory boards to monitor nonprofits concede that
108. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
109. See James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REv. 218,
272-87 (2003).
110. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatrry Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IowAJ. CoRP. L. 1, 7 (2002).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Cummins, supra note 83, at 6.
[Vol. 38
funding increases for state or federal oversight is doubtful. 115 Yet citi-
zen boards are contemplated to operate under the ultimate authority
of state attorneys general. 1 6 It is difficult to imagine how such a struc-
ture could be accomplished without a commensurate budget increase
for the state agencies. While what proponents of oversight boards con-
template may be delegation of current responsibilities by the attorneys
general, the prospect of that, as well as the view that citizen boards can
be convened and supervised without a commensurate increase in en-
forcement funds for the agencies, seems overly-optimistic. None have
suggested how such programs, or even the results they supply, could
be paid for without significantly increasing the enforcement budget of
the attorneys general, something that has not happened to date and is
unlikely to occur in a climate of public sector fiscal crisis.
3. Solution Three: Pay to Play
A third approach suggests the development of private, for-profit
companies charged specifically with evaluating and ensuring compli-
ance by nonprofits, paid for by the companies themselves.11 7 Though
the structure of such companies is not completely developed, it ap-
pears that what is envisioned are businesses that contract with a non-
profit for the right to sue the company under certain predetermined
conditions.1 8 The most significant problem with this approach is that
many, if not most, nonprofits do not have the assets to pay to partici-
pate. There simply are not sufficient discretionary funds available in
most nonprofit corporations to pay watchdog companies. While it has
been suggested that smaller, more innovative programs might be ex-
empt and others would probably cease to exist rather than bear the
costs,'1 9 such an approach raises concerns about who decides which
nonprofits are exempt or determines which nonprofits should go out
of business because they cannot pay the costs of regulation. Even
more disturbing is the prospect that allocating substantial costs to gov-
ernance issues or suing a charitable nonprofit diverts funds intended
by the donors for the charity's work. This is a prospect that is not
palatable for either the nonprofit or its donors.
115. See Fishman, supra note 109, at 272.
116. Id.
117. See Manne, supra note 107, at 229.
118. Id. at 231-40.
119. Id.
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4. Solution Four: Broadened Standing to Sue Nonprofits
The fourth approach recognizes that the exclusive authority of
state attorneys general deprives most others of standing to sue non-
profit corporations. 120 It has therefore been suggested that allowing
other classes besides members, attorneys general, and sitting directors
the right to sue a nonprofit increases accountability. 121 Like compa-
nies formed for the purpose of suing nonprofits, however, increasing
the potential for lawsuits diverts charitable funds from their intended
purposes. Moreover, if nonprofits are forced to defend against anyone
who takes issue with the company's activities, including, presumably,
their political or social message or the populations they serve, many
innovative programs or even controversial social and political causes
may be unable to survive as nonprofit entities. The nonprofit sector at
its best is a mecca of entrepreneurship and creativity, sometimes oper-
ating within or serving the fringes of the social strata. Relaxing the
requirements for standing to sue, unless quite narrowly drawn, would
likely have a significant chilling effect on that spirit of innovation, de-
priving society of all but the most mainstream options. Such an ap-
proach also requires legislative action to change laws currently
limiting standing to sue a nonprofit, which may be difficult or impossi-
ble to obtain in the political arena. It seems unlikely, for example, that
the attorney general of California would support any legislation inter-
fering with that office's exclusive jurisdiction over actions against non-
profits. When legislation removed some healthcare oversight in the
not-too-distant past, California's attorney general did not go quietly,
testing that loss of jurisdictional oversight in the courts.12 2 Finally, in
California at least, a procedure already exists for an interested party to
seek leave of the attorney general's office for "relator status" and ob-
tain its consent to file suit in its stead. 12 3 This suggests that authorizing
members of the public to sue directly could be viewed as superflu-
120. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable
Fiduciaries?, 23J. CoRP. L. 655, 657 (1998).
121. Id.
122. See Van de Kamp v. Gumbiner, 270 Cal. Rptr. 907 (Ct. App. 1990) (Attorney Gen-
eral's challenge to Corporations Code sections 10821-10826, transferring authority over
Heath Maintenance Organizations from the Attorney General's office to the Department
of Corporations).
123. See, e.g., Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 934
(Cal. 1964).
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ous,
1 2 4 although, as a practical matter, it appears that the California
attorney general does not frequently grant that standing.125
5. Solution Five: Legislative Reform
The final approach suggests increased legislative regulation of
nonprofit corporations.1 26 The primary flaws in that proposal are: (1)
state legislatures are unlikely to act en masse to effect structural re-
form, making nonprofit regulation spotty; (2) federal action is unde-
sirable due to the diversity and regional character of the nonprofit
sector; and (3) federal legislation raises sovereignty issues concerning
an area that has traditionally been exclusively within state control. As
with the similar proposal to remove the shield of the business judg-
ment rule, there is also a substantial danger of regulating marginally
solvent nonprofits out of existence.
The current proposal in California is subject to all of those con-
cerns. Industry experts point out that nonprofits with $500,000 in an-
nual revenue are operating on a very short financial leash. 12 7 The
proposals for using different accounting firms for audit and other fi-
nancial services ignores the market reality that the way accountancy
services are priced would keep nonprofits from benefiting from dis-
counts offered for bundled services, thus significantly increasing the
cost of audits. 128 Requiring annual scrutiny of compensation packages
for nonprofit managers restricts boards' ability to enter into meaning-
ful long-term contracts that allow them to attract management talent
and raises the specter of breach in the event annual reviews suggest
premature termination of such contracts. 129 Among the most contro-
versial proposals is the certification of financial statements by top ex-
ecutives. Chief executives already sign annual tax returns under
penalty of perjury13° and, as suggested above, even if executives were
held liable, it is unlikely they would be able to cover any serious
shortfalls from personal funds. Finally, nonprofits already have serious
problems finding qualified volunteers to serve on their boards. Those
with financial expertise have few incentives to take unpaid positions in
124. Id.
125. In Holt, one of few such reported cases, the attorney general's office actively op-
posed an interested party's efforts to obtain relator status. Id.
126. See Manne, supra note 107, at 229.
127. See Cummins, supra note 83, at 6.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
Summer 2004]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
a regulatory environment focused on greater personal financial as
well as potential criminal liability.
B. Toward an Industry-Driven Solution
In light of the interest in accountability issues borne primarily of
the difficulties encountered in the for-profit corporate community,
the time may never be better to confront this problem and move for-
ward with solutions that do not tap the resources of nonprofit organi-
zations or the government to an unacceptable extent. The ideal
solution will allow for the self-governance and entrepreneurship es-
sential to healthy nonprofit companies. Such a solution should also
have as its goal increasing public confidence in charitable organiza-
tions' ability to handle donations in a way that maximizes money go-
ing to those needs served by the organization. To have the best
chance of reaching all of those goals, the solution must come from
the nonprofits themselves.
Nonprofits must be willing to voluntarily divulge their financial
dealings, in a level of detail similar to that required of for-profit corpo-
rations post-Enron. The professionals who deal with nonprofits must
voluntarily undertake some of the oversight responsibilities now im-
posed upon them when serving the financial and legal needs of for-
profit corporations. In that regard, analysis of some general principles
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applicable to for-profit corporations is
appropriate.
The nonprofit industry has demonstrated a significant interest in
implementing new best practices to increase their credibility in the
donor market and avoid the modern specter of weekly front-page sto-
ries of corporate wrongdoing in both the nonprofit and for-profit sec-
tors.13 1  In a recently published work, BoardSource and the
Independent Sector (an organization formed in 1980 to promote the
interests of "charitable, educational, religious, health and social wel-
fare organizations"'132) looked at how charitable nonprofits might
adopt selected provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley to achieve the same goal
of "rebuild[ing] public trust in America's corporate sector" as their
131. See, e.g., Jessica Mitchell, Nonprofits Implement New Accountability Standards, J. REc.
(Oklahoma City),Jan. 30, 2004, at 1; Stephen G. Greene, One in Five Charity Boards Changed
Policies in Past Year, CHRON. PHILANTHROY, Dec. 11, 2003, at 30.
132. INDEP. SECTOR, ABOUT US (2004), at http://www.independentsector.org/about/
about-is.htm (last accessed Apr. 3, 2004).
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for-profit corporate brethren.'3 3 The concept of selective voluntary
adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley has also been discussed among other non-
profits, especially in the healthcare sector, an area particularly sensi-
tive to the burdens of legislatively imposed regulation.
13 4
1. Financial and Audit Committees
One particularly portable feature of the Act concerns the compo-
sition of financial committees of the board of directors that already
exist in most large nonprofits, as well as the board's role in the con-
duct of annual audits. The Act requires that internal financial and
audit committees include individuals with financial expertise and that
no member have any financial interest in the firm's business. 135 This
provision is wise for nonprofits as well.
In the case of PipeVine, financial expertise may well have existed
on the board, but financial oversight by a salaried, interested director
simply does not achieve the desired effect. Both the CEO of PipeVine
and the officer who signed its tax returns were salaried employees of
the company. Having the financial health of a nonprofit overseen by
those who are not directly dependent upon revenue from the com-
pany is just good sense. For example, at least one client of PipeVine
reportedly requested an audit of its contract with the company well
before the financial problems were discovered. This request was re-
jected as not being justified by the value of that particular contract.13 6
Since there was no separate audit committee and the officer who
signed the tax returns received a substantial salary from PipeVine, it
may never be known if an independent audit committee might have
prevented PipeVine's demise. But the fact that at least one client re-
quested and was denied an audit of its accounts handled by the com-
pany, suggests that having a committee comprised of individuals who
are not compensated by the company might not be a bad idea.
All medium to large-sized nonprofits should also conduct annual
outside audits under the watchful eye of an audit committee, consist-
ing of board members with no financial or other connection to the
management of the nonprofit, at least one of whom is a financial ex-
pert. Such a committee, if discharging its responsibilities properly, will
133. BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2003), available at http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/
sarbanesoxley.pdf (last accessed Apr. 3, 2004).
134. Andrew Marks, Coming Down With Sarbanes; Hospitals Taking Preventive Steps in Case
Compliance Rules Spread, CRAIN's N. Y. Bus., Oct. 27, 2003, at 30.
135. See BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 133, at 4-5.
136. Wallack, Charities Had Been Wary of PipeVine, supra note 13, at Al.
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ensure that the financial *information provided by management to the
auditors is as complete and accurate as possible. The outside auditing
firm, or at least the responsible personnel at the firm, should be ro-
tated at least every five years to ensure financial practices are closely
examined by fresh eyes. 137 Such a provision would likely have discov-
ered problems at PipeVine much sooner. When PipeVine's auditors
were unable to find the problems even after being informed of them,
the second look auditors found them immediately, suggesting that the
"fresh look" was beneficial. While it may be increasingly difficult to
find interested community members with financial expertise to serve
as volunteer board members, if nonprofits independently require an-
nual audits by a rotating outside auditing firm, this will help the non-
profits themselves control decisions regarding how many individuals,
and with what expertise, are needed to suit their specific situation.
Legislative imposition of standards necessarily imposes a one-size-fits-
all approach that nonprofits can avoid if they design audit committees
and other board oversight themselves to meet their own particular
needs.
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that corporate officers certify the fi-
nancial data used to prepare annual audits. The intention of the pro-
vision is to make officers more accountable in the event improprieties
are detected. However, it has the additional benefit of encouraging
them to become familiar with the company's financial data to allow
for meaningful certification. There are potential negatives for the
nonprofit charitable organization due to the voluntary service by most
nonprofit officers and directors and the potential reluctance of com-
munity members to serve in that capacity if faced with significant lia-
bility. This exemplifies, however, one of the benefits to nonprofits
resulting from voluntary adoption of provisions of the Act. Those non-
profits with paid directors and officers or particularly large organiza-
tions could adopt such requirements for their highly compensated
directors and financial officers, consistent with each organization's
unique needs. Smaller nonprofits need not incur the additional ex-
pense or potential liability. If such a provision were to be imposed by
statute, however, it is likely to apply to many more and smaller organi-
zations than a reasonable, voluntary approach would. If the nonprofit
sector can demonstrate relatively widespread voluntary adoption of fi-
nancial accountability standards, its representatives might have more
137. See BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 133, at 5.
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success convincing state legislators that a full legislative response is as
unnecessary as it is unwise.
2. The Corporation's Advisors
Nonprofits might also consider, as the Act mandates, requiring
attorneys and accountants hired by the companies to render financial
and legal services to be proactive whenever and wherever they dis-
cover facts leading them to believe there are problems. 138 Uniting all
interested parties in the goal of illuminating potential problems and
encouraging the dissemination of "bad news" to the decision makers
is the best deterrent to the kinds of catastrophic financial problems
exemplified by the PipeVine failure. Professionals may need the cli-
ent's encouragement to ask the tough questions and pursue the an-
swers. If not, a climate may develop in which professionals are subtly
(or even overtly) discouraged from pursuing or delivering bad news.
Had PipeVine's outside auditors discovered and alerted PipeVine's
board of directors of the accounting irregularities of which at least
some PipeVine employees were plainly aware, 139 it is doubtful that rea-
sonably responsible directors would have allowed the deficits to
continue.
If caught early enough, there are few financial problems that can-
not be kept from becoming worse, even where they may not be imme-
diately solved. If Sarbanes-Oxley accomplishes nothing else, it has
certainly increased the vigilance of professionals who render assis-
tance to corporations. 140 Nonprofit companies might benefit from
that increased vigilance by including clauses tailored to their particu-
lar needs for oversight in consulting and other agreements for legal
and financial services, thus sending the important message to their
consultants that they need and want the whole truth.
3. Executive Compensation
Few facts incite public ire more than hearing that the chief execu-
tives of a failed company continued to draw six or seven figure salaries
while "Rome burned." It is therefore worthwhile for nonprofits to con-
138. Id.
139. See Second Amended Complaint at 3, Chu v. PipeVine, Inc., No. CGC-03-420951
(Super. Ct. S.F. County Sept. 9, 2003) (original complaint filed May 30, 2003).
140. Chad Terhune, KPMG Resigns as Lancer Auditor After Finding 'Likely Illegal Acts,'
WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2004, at B2 (reporting a company's outside auditor's withdrawal of its
audit opinions on the company's financial results, claiming that the company had "not
taken timely and appropriate remedial actions with respect to the illegal acts" discovered
after investigation of a whistleblower's allegations).
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sider a regular schedule for reviewing executive compensation. While
concerns are properly raised about the propriety of requiring such
review by law due to contractual and other concerns, 41 the sector, or
even individual nonprofits, can voluntarily undertake the task. If, for
example, executive compensation packages were routinely tied to the
fundraising, financial, philanthropic, or any other articulated goals of
the nonprofit, then failure to meet those objectives would already be a
legitimate reason to revisit compensation. Boards would have the flex-
ibility to continue or even sweeten the agreement if any of those goals
were adequately met without fear of liability where they were perhaps
not all met. In other words, the boards could demonstrate their rea-
sonable business judgment and adequate oversight just by undertak-
ing a comprehensive review as long as there was a reasonable,
articulated basis for their actions. Moreover, consideration of the pa-
rameters of compensation, at the time compensation agreements are
entered into, will allow companies to build in the specifics of the re-
view process and avoid unpleasant surprises for the executives or the
board.
4. Transparency
While disclosure of financial statements, audits, and tax returns
does nothing in itself to prevent or solve financial crises, disclosure is
a step that all nonprofits with a website or a copy machine can reason-
ably implement. The mere willingness to do so tells the giving public
that the company has nothing to hide. It also speaks loudly of the
firm's integrity. If imposed by legislation, disclosure will likely require
nonprofits to report to federal and/or state agencies, imposing an ad-
ditional, costly administrative burden beyond the disclosure itself. For-
profit corporations in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley complain of the
crippling increased costs of the reporting requirements, both in com-
pliance and lost productivity.1 42 Moreover, imposed transparency is
unlikely to have as strong a positive effect on the trust of the giving
public as voluntary disclosure would, where the company is telling the
world on its own terms that it can be trusted as opposed to being
viewed as merely complying with law.
Some will ask: why should nonprofits voluntarily adopt practices
that will make it more cumbersome and expensive to operate? There
are two reasons. First, if nonprofits do not step up and take visible and
141. See Cummins, supra note 83, at 6.
142. See Deborah Soloman, Companies Complain About Cost of Corporate-Governance Rules,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at Al.
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demonstrable steps toward self-governance, the result of recent fail-
ures is likely to be increased government regulation-a result the sec-
tor seeks to avoid. Second, a solution the industry itself proposes is a
more lasting and meaningful one. One of the primary reasons to im-
prove nonprofit governance is to increase credibility with the giving
public. If the nonprofit sector finds and implements its own solutions,
it will be seen as a healthy, proactive group with watchful management
and therefore more deserving of public trust and confidence. As the
BoardSource report concludes: "Self-regulation and proactive behav-
ior will always prove more powerful than compulsory respect of
laws."' 143 In order for that commitment to have meaning, however,
and ultimately lead to the increased credibility and restoration of pub-
lic trust that nonprofits desire, the efforts must be more than just a
window-dressing public relations campaign. 144
Conclusion
Those close to the situation knew, and others should have known,
that PipeVine's accounting procedures were hopeless. To the extent
that PipeVine's accountants claimed they did not know, someone in
the company failed in their responsibility to tell the auditors that the
company regularly commingled operating funds and donations in the
same bank account and then voided checks without adjusting the
ledgers. Directors, including the one who signed the tax returns,
plainly had access and should have known that the commingling of
operating and trust funds in a single bank account was an accident
waiting to happen. While that information alone might not have kept
PipeVine afloat, it could have stopped the practice, prevented the def-
icit from growing at such an alarming rate, provided responsible par-
ties with a basis to renegotiate agreements with clients to meet
increased operating costs, or, at a minimum, led to a decision to fold
the company before the deficit became so large.
If the nonprofit sector wants to continue enjoying the benefits of
tax exemption and autonomy allowed under current law, it must vol-
untarily get its own house in order, lest one or more of the other
143. BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 133, at 10.
144. While it is too soon to tell and therefore unfair to judge, the technical advisory
board for financial matters recently announced by United Way of the Bay Area needs to
quickly develop and implement policies before such efforts can be credibly claimed to go
beyond mere public relations. See UNITED WAY OF THE BAY AREA, OUR COMMITMENT OF
ACCOUNTABILITY, at http://www.uwba.org/about-us/commitment.htm (last accessed Apr.
4, 2004).
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approaches to the problems of nonprofit failures be legislatively
adopted and imposed. The only solution that can be immediately and
successfully implemented is a concrete and attainable strategy that
each and every nonprofit organization can employ with little govern-
ment intervention-that is, one of their own making. Much of the
work remaining to be done by nonprofits is in designing a viable strat-
egy, anticipating and addressing its potential pitfalls, and implement-
ing it. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a reasonable place to start.
Those aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley most likely to benefit nonprofits
might have prevented, or at least foretold, the PipeVine disaster. Of
course, the beneficial effects of Sarbanes-Oxley depend upon its ulti-
mate efficacy, even for its targeted for-profit entities. Such analysis is
left to others. What is suggested by this Comment is that what is good
for the for-profit goose may also, with appropriate modification, bene-
fit the nonprofit gander.
